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It is known that a player in a noncooperative game can bene¯t by publicly re-
stricting their possible moves before start of play. We show that, more generally,
a player may bene¯t by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount
that is contingent on the game's outcome. We explore what happens when external
parties { who we call \game miners" { discover this fact and seek to pro¯t from it
by entering an outcome-contingent contract with the players. We analyze various
bargaining games between miners and players for determining such an outcome-
contingent contract. We establish restrictions on the strategic settings in which
a game miner can pro¯t, and bounds on the game miner's pro¯t given various
structured bargaining games. These bargaining games include playing the players
against one another, as well as allowing the players to pay the miner(s) for exclu-
sivity and ¯rst-mover advantage. We also establish that when all players can enter
contracts with miners, to guarantee the existence of equilibria it is necessary to
assume that players can randomize over the contracts they make.
We would like to thank Mark Wilber and Nicholas Shunda for helpful discussion.
11 Introduction
1.1 How to Mine a Game
That players can bene¯t in games by entering contracts that distort payo® functions is
well-documented in the economic literature [see Schelling (1956); Sobel (1981); Vickers
(1985)]. In this paper we focus on a special case of this phenomenon: A player i may
bene¯t by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent
on the game's outcome. That bene¯t to i may or may not be accompanied by a loss to
i's opponents. Similarly, i may bene¯t by publicly paying an external party to make an
outcome-contingent payment to i's opponent in the game. In this paper we explore what
happens when external parties discover such facts and seek to pro¯t from them.
To ground the discussion, we present two examples.
Example 1. Somali pirates hijack an oil tanker. They can get $1,000 for it on the black
market. To the oil company it is worth $2,000. The oil company can take the tanker by
force at a cost of $1,700. The pirates have a set business plan, under which they demand
a ransom of $1,500 for tankers of this size. The oil company counters that demand with
an o®er of $1,100 and says that if the pirates do not accept it, then rather than pay the
$1,500 they will take the tanker by force. The pirates refuse because it is a non-credible
threat (the oil company would lose $200 by taking the tanker by force, relative to paying
the pirates what they ask). The unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is for the oil
company to pay the random. Accordingly, the oil company decides to pay the ransom,
and is about to do so.
Game Mining Inc. watches this negotiation. Just before the oil company pays the
ransom, they o®er the oil company the following contract, making sure the pirates see
them do this: \Pay us $399 up front, and we will keep $198 no matter what. Make your
threat again. If the pirates refuse your threat again and you take the tanker by force, we
will give you $201. Otherwise we will give you nothing."
If the oil company were to accept this contract, then their threat would become
credible, and so the pirates would have to yield to it. Accordingly, the oil company
accepts this contract because without the contract the unique SPE yields them $500,
while with the contract the unique SPE yields them $501. The pirates lose $400 when
the oil company makes the contract. Game Mining Inc. makes $399. 3
2Example 2. There are two cell-phone manufacturers, Anonymous (A) and Brandname
(B). They must simultaneously decide how many cell phones to produce. Each ¯rm has
two options, high output (H) or low output (L). Anonymous, like its name suggests,
is not well known. Therefore, no matter what level of output Brandname produces,
Anonymous prefers to produce high output to gain brand recognition. On the other
hand, Brandname's choice of output does depend on Anonymous's choice. If Anonymous
produces low output, then Brandname prefers to keep prices high by also producing
low output. However, if Anonymous produces high output, then Brandname prefers to
safeguard its recognized name by also producing high output. The moves and payo®s (in






The NE is (H;H), and payo®s are (1;:5).
Game Mining Inc. watches this, and just before Anonymous and Brandname declare
their output decisions, Game Mining o®ers Anonymous the following contract, making
sure Brandname sees them do this: \Pay us $1.5 million right now. Then we will pay
you back a certain amount after you and Brandname make your decisions. Here is how














In the resultant game, Anonymous randomizes, and the unique NE is very close
to (2=3;H). For Anonymous, this results in an average payo® of approximately $1.5
million. This is a $500,000 improvement over its payo® without the contract. On average,
3Game Mining Inc. makes approximately $160,000 for their trouble. Brandname, on
average, makes approximately $333,333. This is a $166,666 decrease in Brandname's
payo® compared to the situation where Anonymous and Game Mining Inc. do not have
a contract.
Note that the Coaseian outcome of the game without a game miner would be for
Anonymous to pay at least $500,001 to Brandname for the outcome (H;L) [see Coase
(1960)]. So Game Mining Inc. is not merely facilitating the Coaseian outcome. The
presence of Game Mining Inc. creates an entirely new strategic setting. 3
Note that in Ex. 1, GM Inc. could have instead o®ered a contract that the oil
company would accept where the oil company pays only $100 now, and then pays an
outcome-contingent extra amount later. So there may be bargaining over the details of
the contract. In that bargaining, in e®ect GM Inc. is asked by the oil company, \How
much do I need to pay you now in exchange for an obligation to pay you more later?" In
other words, in situations like in Ex. 1, the only burden on GM Inc. in the bargaining
is to maximize the \free money" that the player wants to give it (!). The reason game
mining scenarios can be so serendipitous to the game miner(s) is that the player bene¯ts
from the obligation to pay the game miner(s). Therefore, the player is willing to pay for
that obligation. Similarly a player may be willing to pay the game miner not to sign a
contract with the other player for fear of the consequences that the contract would have
on the outcome of the game.
In all of these examples, Game Mining Inc. makes considerable pro¯t from recognizing
a situation in which one party bene¯ts from an output-contingent contract. But if Game
Mining Inc. makes a pro¯t, then other mining ¯rms will surely want to o®er the winning
party (the oil company or the Anonymous cell-phone company, respectively) their own
contract at a lower price. Similarly, the losing party (the pirates or the Brandname
cell-phone company, respectively) might want to make contracts with miners.
This raises the issue of what happens if the game miner can o®er contracts to both
players. As an example, it may be that the miner o®ers contracts to both players with
the following properties. First, both players have a strictly dominant strategy to accept
the o®ered contract. Second, when they both inevitably accept, the outcome is that they
are both worse o®, and the game miner pro¯ts considerably. In fact, the game miner
may even promise to pay the players large sums of money if certain outcomes obtain,
4knowing full well that when all of the players accept the o®ered contracts, such outcomes
will never obtain. (To do this, the game miner e®ectively creates a prisoner's dilemma
among the players for her own bene¯t.)
There are also considerable timing issues in game mining. When players sequentially
sign contracts with game miners, there can be a signi¯cant ¯rst-mover advantage to the
¯rst-signing player. This provides the game miner with yet another opportunity for pro¯t;
they can charge the players to move ¯rst.
It's also worth noting that in many mining scenarios, mixed contracts are needed
to guarantee the existence of equilibria. With such contracts, players have uncertainty
about their opponent's payo®s. However, unlike in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in game
mining this uncertainty is resolved before the game is played. Its only role is to make
the players indi®erent among their own contracts. That is, a player will say, \Given
that you will select a contract (and therefore an ultimate payo® function) according
to that probability distribution, I am indi®erent among the following contracts (and
therefore ultimate payo® functions). So I will randomize over them with this probability
distribution, which in turn makes you indi®erent among the contracts in the support of
your probability distribution."
1.2 Related Literature
The ideas underlying the game mining concept are implicit in a large body of economic
literature. As an illustration, in the model presented in Jackson and Wilkie (2005) (JW),
every player speci¯es outcome-contingent side-payments that they will make after a non-
cooperative strategic form game is played and the payo®s are resolved. These side-
payments are binding contracts, so the players are ex ante determining their preferences
over the game's outcomes. In this regard the game that the players actually play is
endogenously determined. JW examine whether a mechanism that allows players to
make such outcome-contingent side-payments generally results in e±cient outcomes and
conclude that it does not.
The simplest game-mining scenario, e.g., in Ex.'s 1 and 2, can be viewed as a special
case of JW. In this special case, the only outcome-contingent side-payments are between
the players and the game miners and the game miners would be indi®erent over outcomes
of the game if not for the fact that they will be receiving side-payments dependent on
those outcomes. Furthermore, the game miners play no part in the game between the
5players other than to accept contracts for outcome-contingent side-payments and make
the contracts public.
In contrast to JW, we do not focus on e±ciency issues, and we do not assume that
a social planner installs a mechanism for players to make side-payments. Instead, we
look at a game without formal mechanisms and ask whether external parties will create
contracts for outcome-contingent side-payments in pursuit of pro¯t. In particular, we
examine the implications of giving the game miner the power to o®er contracts, which
will in general increase the game miner's pro¯ts. In addition, we relax the assumption
in JW that all side-payments are nonnegative. That is, we allow game miners to pay
players for certain outcomes. This will be important when examining optimal contracts
as well as the extent to which a monopolist game miner can extract pro¯ts from players.
We also consider how things change when there is more than one miner, when mining
contracts are o®ered in sequence, etc. None of those issues arise in JW.
In another related paper, Renou (2009) analyzes what happens when players are able
to embed the original game in a new two-stage game. In the second stage of that new
game the players play the original game. However before they do so, in the ¯rst stage, the
players each simultaneously commit not to play some subset of their possible moves in
that game in the second stage. These commitment games can be seen as another special
case of JW in which (1) player i's side-payments are only contingent on i's action (rather
than on the full pro¯le of actions), (2) the side-payments are made to external players
and (3) the side-payments are e®ectively in¯nite. Renou's analysis does not apply to the
full game mining scenario. This is because there are many circumstances in which both
the player and the game miner prefer to make contracts that are fully outcome-contingent
and that have non-in¯nite side-payments. One particular example is when the player and
game miner ¯nd it optimal to agree on a contract that results in an equilibrium where
the player uses a mixed strategy with full support (and therefore does not make any
commitment in the ¯rst stage of Renou's two-stage game).
The idea that there might be pre-game play in which players make choices to a®ect
their own preferences over outcomes is also present in Wolpert et al. (2008). The authors
analyze the idea that experimentally observed non-rationality is in fact rational, because
by committing to play the game with a non-rational \persona", a player may increase her
ultimate payo®. This persona has the same e®ect as a side-payment or commitment, as
it is re°ected in a temporary change to the player's utility function. The persona games
6model has been successful in explaining non-rational behavior in non-repeated traveler's
dilemma and even in versions of the non-repeated prisoner's dilemma.
There is a subset of the principal-agent literature concerning delegation games that
is closely related to game mining. In these models, the principal is able to contract
with an agent that will engage in a game with the principal's opponent (or agent of the
principal's opponent). One concern of this literature is detailing the optimal contract for
a principal [see Vickers (1985); Fershtman (1985); Sklivas (1987)]. Another concern is
whether a mechanism that allows speci¯c types of contracts can lead to Pareto e±ciency
[see Fershtman et al. (1991); Katz (1991)]. Game mining is closely related to a previously
unexplored aspect of principal-agent scenarios: the degree to which the agents can pro¯t
from delegation contracts.
Finally, our work is related to the general literature on commitment in games be-
cause, at its core, game mining is about what happens when players bene¯t by strate-
gically restricting themselves. One well-studied aspect of commitment is the role of
timing. Papers such as Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), van Damme and Hurkens (1996)
and Romano and Yildirim (2005) concern endogenous timing and Stackelberg-like com-
mitments. Another area of study is the role of commitment in repeated games. In their
study of ¯nitely repeated games, Garcia-Jurado and Gonzalez-Diaz (2006) introduce a
weakening of SPE called virtual subgame perfect equilibrium. Kalai et al. (2007) also
study commitment in ¯nitely repeated games, but do so in a manner similar to JW. That
is, they are concerned with the role of commitment in bringing about e±ciency.
1.3 Overview
We start by introducing the game-mining model and notation. We then analyze the ways
in which games can be mined.
Next, in Sec. 2, we assume that only one player interacts with one game miner. We
derive bounds on the aggregate payo®s that the game miner and player can earn together.
We show that they can select a contract to divide these payo®s in any way between them.
We also show that outcome-contingent contracts cannot be pro¯table for both the game
miner and contracting player if the other player has a strictly dominant strategy.
In the rest of the paper we consider various market structures, i.e., various structured
bargaining games involving the players of the underlying noncooperative game and one or
more external ¯rms trying to mine that the players of that underlying game. First, in the
7next section we analyze a structured bargaining game between two players and a single
game miner (i.e. a monopolist ¯rm that handles all outcome-contingent contracts). We
begin with the assumption that players o®er contracts to the game miner and the game
miner must choose either one of the o®ered contracts or neither contract. We show that
the game miner can pro¯t by more than the maximal payo® to either player in the game
without contracts. (This is because players can su®er a loss if their opponent outbids
them for the right to contract with the game miner.)
Next we relax some of these assumptions. First we allow the game miner to accept
both o®ers if she so chooses. This reduces the game miner's bargaining power, and we ¯nd
that the game miner can always do at least as well by restricting herself to accept only
one contract. Next we discuss the role of timing and ¯rst-mover advantage, establishing
that the players may be willing to pay for the right to contract ¯rst with the game miner,
even when their opponent has a strictly dominant strategy.
We end this section by analyzing the case where the miner has the bargaining power,
i.e., she is the one making the o®ers. We show that this allows the game miner to \play
the players against one another" and thereby increase her pro¯t. We also derive an upper
bound on this pro¯t.
In section ¯ve we look at perfect competition and duopoly miner market structures.
We develop the notion of best contract response correspondences and mixed contracts to
discuss the existence of equilibria when players simultaneously choose contracts. We also
detail the way in which a duopolist game miner's pro¯ts depend on the game that arises
as a result of contracts.
In section six we brie°y discuss several new research areas opened by game-mining.
These areas include games of more than two players, and risk aversion on the part of the
game miner. We also brie°y consider unstructured bargaining among the players and the
miner to determine the contract. We also touch on an \inverted" version of this topic,
where the underlying game is itself unstructured, while the miner(s) negotiate with the
player(s) via structured bargaining to determine a contract for that underlying game.
We also discuss the idea that one player signs a contract that obligates him to pay the
other player outcome-contingent amounts. This obligation may actually help the payer
and hurt the payee.
82 Notation
We study a two-player, one-stage simultaneous-move game of complete information. How-
ever, we relax the usual assumption that the two players cannot make outcome-contingent
contracts (or simply contracts) with players external to the game.
Specify the two-player pre-contract game as ¡ = (fA;BgfXA;XBg;fUA;UBg). Ui is
an jXAj-by-jXBj matrix for which the (m;n) entry gives the payo® to i when A chooses
his m'th pure strategy and B chooses his n'th pure strategy. Player i's set of mixed
strategies is ¢i, i = A;B, and the set of mixed strategy pro¯les is ¢ = ¢A £ ¢B. We
write all of i's pure and mixed strategies as jXij-by-one vectors ¾i for which the m'th
entry gives the probability that ¾i assigns to playing i's m'th pure strategy. Therefore,




where superscript¡T indicates matrix transpose.
Player i's best response correspondence is given by R¡
i (¢) : ¢j ! 2¢i, so that
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A 2 ¢Ag: (1)
Therefore, the set of Nash equilibria of game ¡ is given by
NE(¡) = f(¾A;¾B) : ¾A 2 R
¡
A(¾B) and ¾B 2 R
¡
B(¾A)g:
An outcome-contingent contract between player A and an external player C is a matrix
DA that speci¯es a (possibly negative) transfer from A to C for every outcome of ¡. We
refer to player C as the game miner, and if players use strategies (¾A;¾B), then under con-
tract DA player A expects to pay ¾T
ADA¾B to player C. Hence, de¯ning U
DA
A ´ UA¡DA,
player A's expected payo® is ¾T
AU
DA
A ¾B. Therefore, we can view DA as a transformation
of ¡. We write the post-contract game as ¡(DA) = ffA;Bg;fXA;XBg;fU
DA
A ;UBgg. We
write the set of possible contracts as D = RjXAj £ RjXBj. The notation D0 denotes the
null contract, where all entries are zero.
93 Maximal Mining
Before introducing a formal strategic setting for game mining in the next section, we
¯rst explore the way that a player A and game miner C can work together to extract
gains from ¡. We will ¯rst need to know the aggregate payo®s from a contract. These
are the amounts that the contracting parties can earn in equilibrium and divide among
themselves. Suppose A and C are the contracting parties and DA is their contract. Then
the aggregate payo® that is apportioned between A and C is given by the payo® that A
gets at a NE in ¡(DA) before A pays to C the amount speci¯ed in DA.
De¯nition 1. The aggregate payo® set for A and C from DA is:
MA(DA) = f¾
T
AUA¾B : (¾A;¾B) 2 NE(¡(DA))g
We denote by M¤
A(DA) the maximum of the aggregate payo® set from DA. The
maximum over all aggregate payo® sets is MA ´ maxDA2DfM¤
A(DA)g. It is the maximum
that A and C can possibly have to divide among themselves in any NE of any game in
which they sign a contract. We refer to this quantity as the maxagg (maximum aggregate
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AUA¾B : (¾A;¾B) 2 NE(¡(DA))gg (3)
Recall that the contract DA does not a®ect B's payo®s UB. This means that NE(¡(DA)) =
f¾ 2 ¢ : ¾A 2 R
¡(DA)
A (¾B) and ¾B 2 R¡
B(¾A)g. The trouble is to choose DA so that
A's best response correspondence meets B's best response function at the maximizers
that correspond to MA, (¾A;¾B). This problem is solved trivially by choosing DA such
that A is indi®erent among all strategy pairs. Then every action of A is a best response
to every action of B, including ¾B, which, by assumption is in R¡
B(¾A).





AUA¾B : ¾B 2 R
¡
B(¾A)gg;
10which is the same as equation 2 because the set f¾T
AUA¾B : ¾B 2 R¡
B(¾A)g is independent
of DA.
So to ¯nd the maximum aggregate payo®s for A and C, we simply search B's best
response correspondences to all of A's moves for the one giving maximum payo® to
A. This allows us to restrict our analysis to the values of UA along B's best response
correspondence. Note how this di®ers from the NE concept: Here A has the freedom
not to be forced to make his best response to B. Only B is being forced to make a
best-response.
We do not mean to imply that maxagg is some reasonable re¯nement of a NE. By
de¯nition of maxagg, such a claim would imply that the players coordinate on the NE
that most bene¯ts A. Instead, maxagg is nothing more than an upper bound on what is
possible for A and C to obtain by making a contract.
In the real world, a game miner would be concerned with downside risk of any given
contract. That is, the game miner would be reluctant to sign a contract DA if the
game ¡(DA) has NE in which C loses money. Now consider the Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPE) concept applied to the extensive form game in which C ¯rst decides
whether to accept a given contract DA, and then the associated underlying game ¡(DA) is
played if C accepts the contract. Under that equilibrium concept, when deciding whether
to accept DA, C knows what NE of ¡(DA) would be played if C accepts. Hence, under
that concept, C is only concerned with her payo® as prescribed by the strategies of A and
B in some single associated NE of ¡(DA) (see analysis below of SPE of game mining). In
the real world though, if ¡(DA) contains multiple NE, the a game miner does not know
with certainty which NE of ¡(DA) would be played if C accepted the contact DA. Due
to this, in the real world, a \conservative" game miner C might choose a contract that
maximizes the minimum aggregate payo® to be divided between A and C, to minimize
how bad the situation for C could be a \worst case" NE of ¡(DA).
We write this minimum of the aggregate payo® set MA(DA) as MA(DA). Maximizing








AUA¾B : ¾ 2 NE(¡(DA))g:
Trivially, MA ¸ MA(D0). Comparing maxminagg with maxagg, we also know that
MA · MA. And when there exists a contract DA such that MA(DA) = fMAg, we have
11that MA = MA. That is, if there exists a contract DA such that the only NE of ¡(DA)
yields the maxagg to A and C, then the maxagg and maxminagg are the same.
The next example uses maxagg and maxminagg to illustrate a distinction between
general game mining and commitment games.1 In this example, maxagg is associated
with a NE ¾A that is a mixed strategy with full support. However in this example, a
commitment by A to play (or not play) certain pure strategies will never allow A and C
to achieve the maxagg; communication games are a restricted subclass of game mining.
On the other hand, contracts that achieve the maxagg also give rise to a NE with an
aggregate payo® lower than maxagg. This mean that we would not expect a conservative
miner to choose that maxagg. To address this. we show that there are contracts that yield
a unique NE for which the aggregate payo® is arbitrarily close to the maxagg. Because
the NE is unique, this aggregate payo® is the maxminagg of concern to a conservative
miner. Hence even a conservative miner would want a contract that causes ¾A to be fully
mixed, so that A would not make any commitment.
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> > > :
l if p > 2
3
r if p < 2
3
q 2 [0;1] if p = 2
3.
If A chooses p < 2
3, then B will choose r, and the payo® to A will be 2p+1(1¡p) = 1+p.
Likewise, if A chooses p > 2
3, then B will choose l, and the payo® will be p. If A chooses
p = 2
3 then B chooses any combination of l and r yielding payo®s to A between 2
3 and
5
3. Therefore, the maximum payo® for A along R¡
B is when ¾A = (p;1 ¡ p) = (2
3; 1
3) and
1Commitment games, in which a player commits before the game not to play certain pure strategies,
are a special case of game mining, where only contracts that result in one or more strictly dominated





















In other words, the maxagg payo® for A and C is achieved by a mixed strategy. The
problem is that there is no contract DA such that ¡(DA) has a unique NE with maxagg
the payo® to A. Moreover, for those DA's such there is a NE of ¡(DA) with A's payo®
equaling 5=3, there are other NE with A's payo® less than 1. 1 is also A's payo® in every
NE of ¡, so it would appear that A has no incentive to form a contract with Game Mining.
However, there are contracts that produce a unique NE under which the aggregate payo®
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There is a unique NE for all " > 0. As " approaches zero, that NE approaches (2=3;r), so
the maxminagg approaches 5=3. Finally, we note that the Coaseian outcome is for A to
pay B to play r for a price of :5+"0 for some small "0. This di®ers from the outcome under
game mining. This illustrates that game mining is not just a way to facilitate Coaseian
outcomes when players cannot directly cooperate. Rather the presence of a game miner
transforms the strategic setting in a way that cooperation cannot.
means that this Coaseian transaction cannot take place. Therefore, in this example,
the game miner provides a service that the players could not provide themselves. 3
The maxminagg is a reasonable concept, especially when the game miner cannot know
for certain which of multiple NE will be played by the players. However, in this paper
we will rely exclusively on the SPE concept applied to extensive form games where the
contracts are chosen before the underlying game is played. This concept requires that
when choosing a contract the game miner knows which of multiple NE will be adopted by
the players in the following, underlying game. Accordingly, SPE says that the miner can
perfectly forecast which NE of the underlying game gets played. Whether or not such
13perfect forecasting is realistic | and it arguably is not |- it is demanded by the SPE
concept. Therefore, from now on, with few exceptions we depart from the maxminagg
concept, leaving for future work an analysis of game mining that incorporates maxminagg
more fully.
The preceding results consider what A and C can achieve together. However, through-
out the remainder of the paper, we will be interested in the pro¯ts that the game miner
is able to extract from the strategic situation given by ¡. Therefore, we now address the
way in which A and C are able to divide aggregate payo®s. The following result says
that they are able to incorporate any division of the aggregate payo®s directly into the
contract without a®ecting the best response correspondence of A or B. (Whether A and
C would accept such a division is a di®erent issue.)
Theorem 2. For any a 2 R and ¾¤ = (¾¤
A;¾¤
B) such that ¾¤
B 2 R¡
B(¾¤













Proof. By theorem 1 there exists a contract DA such that (¾¤
A;¾¤
B) 2 NE(¡(DA)). Let
1 stand for a matrix all of whose entries are 1. So (¾¤
A)T1¾¤
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Theorem 2 says that the aggregate payo®s that A and C get by mining are not a®ected
by a restriction on the way in which A and C divide those payo®s. So how MA is divided
between A and C in equilibrium will be determined by strategic rather than technical
considerations. This will be convenient when we introduce a formal strategic environment
in the next section.
In some settings, there is no contract such that A and C can both bene¯t in any NE
of the post-contract game. One example where this is always the case is when B has a
strictly dominant strategy. The intuition is that A's contract with C will never change
B's payo®s. Therefore, B will always play his dominant strategy, no matter what the
contract. Therefore there is nothing that a contract can do to help A. This intuition is
formalized in the following result.
14Theorem 3. If B has a strictly dominant strategy, then there is no contract DA such
that A and C both strictly bene¯t in any NE of ¡(DA).




B(¾A) for all ¾A 2 ¢A. Hence the set of NE in ¡ is
f¾






AUA~ xB and ¾
¤
B = ~ xBg
and the set of NE in ¡(DA) is






A ~ xB and ~ ¾B = ~ xBg:
If C bene¯ts by entering contract DA, then ~ ¾T
ADA~ xB > 0.
But this means that ~ ¾T
AUA~ xB > ~ ¾T
AU
DA
A ~ xB. Since ¾¤T
A UA~ xB ¸ ~ ¾T
AUA~ xB, by combining
we have ¾¤T
A UA~ xB > ~ ¾T
AU
DA
A ~ xB for all ¾¤; ~ ¾. Accordingly, A will not bene¯t by signing
DA.
Theorem 3 puts a restriction on the set of games ¡ in which A will bene¯t from
the services of a game miner. However, as is shown in later sections, there are ample
opportunities for a game miner to pro¯t from situations in which player B has a strictly
dominant strategy. In general, such a situation requires that B also has an opportunity
to make a payo®-contingent contract with the miner.
The next result establishes limits on game mining of interest to a \conservative"
miner, when one player has a weakly dominant strategy.
Theorem 4. If B has a weakly dominant strategy, then there is no contract DA such that
both A and C strictly bene¯t in every NE of ¡(DA) compared to not signing any contract.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose x¤
B is weakly dominant and DA is a contract such that
both A and C bene¯t in every NE of ¡(DA). There is a NE (x¤
A;x¤
B) of ¡. For every



























which in turn contradicts the fact that C is better o®.
Theorem 4 tells us that A and C cannot eliminate the risk of loss in a NE of ¡(DA)
if B has a weakly dominant strategy in such a game. If A and C are both conservative
and require that they gain in every NE of ¡(DA), then no contract will be made between
them.
4 Monopolist Miner
4.1 C Accepts One Contract
Consider a situation in which players A and B encounter each other in a simultaneous
move game with perfect information, ¡ = hfA;BgfXA;XBg;fUA;UBgi. There is only
one external party, C, that is willing to accept publicly observable outcome contingent
contracts. Before A and B play ¡, they simultaneously o®er contracts to C. These
contracts are called DA and DB respectively.
After observing DA and DB, C chooses either DA, DB or D0 (the null contract).
Players A and B observe this contract and recognize its legally binding nature. A and B
then engage in the simultaneous move game ¡(Di). ¡(Di) is the post-contract subgame.
Formally, this is a perfect information extensive form game with three stages:
Stage One: Players A and B simultaneously o®er contracts DA and DB to C.
Stage Two: C chooses DA, DB or the null contract D0.
Stage Three: Players A and B play ¡(Dj).
A strategy Si for i = A;B in the extensive form game is a pair Si = (Di;si). The
¯rst component, Di 2 D, is the o®er that i makes to C in the ¯rst stage. The second
component is a function from the space of all possible contracts, D, to the space of
probability distributions over actions x and y, i.e. si : D 7! ¢i. In other words, si gives
i's strategy for every possible post-contract subgame. The pro¯le of strategies of player
A and player B are written as S¡C where s¡C = (sA;sB).
16In stage two, C selects an element of the choice set DC = fDA;DB;D0g. SC is the
function that takes as input the history (DA;DB) and returns an element of DC as C's
choice. Note that DC is speci¯ed by s¡C = (sA;sB).
Given a full strategy pro¯le (SA;SB;SC), C's payo®s are
UC(SA;SB;SC) = sA(SC(DA;DB))
TSC(DA;DB)sB(SC(DA;DB)):
SC(DA;DB) is C's stage two choice given the stage one actions (DA;DB), and sA(SC(DA;DB))







i gives i's payo®s in the post-contract game ¡(SC(DA;DB)). As short-




De¯nition 2. A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of ¡C is a strategy pro¯le S =
(SA;SB;SC) such that:
1. (sA(D);sB(D)) 2 NE(¡(D)) for all contracts D 2 R2 £ R2.

























A (mutatis mutandi for B).
We turn our attention to ¯nding the maximum amount that can be mined from ¡. To
17do so, we introduce a concept that is related to the aggregate payo® set from de¯nition
1:
De¯nition 3. The aggregate payo® function for A and C from DA is:
mA(DAjs¡C) = sA(DA)UA(DA)sB(DA):
The aggregate payo® function di®ers from the aggregate payo® set. Whereas the
aggregate payo® set includes payo®s for all NE of ¡(DA), the aggregate payo® function
simply returns the sum of A and C's payo®s when s¡C is played in ¡(DA). For example, if
s¡C selects a NE of the post-contract subgame ¡(DA), then the aggregate payo® function
mA(DAjs¡C) selects one element from the aggregate payo® set MA(DA). We denote by
^ Di a contract that maximizes A's aggregate payo® function. We denote by DA the set of
all such maximizers.
In an SPE, C will choose whichever contract yields her the highest payo® as deter-
mined by (sA;sB). Given that, i's contract should o®er more to C than is o®ered by j's
contract only if j's contract o®ers less than mi( ^ Dijs¡C) ¡ sA(Dj)TUisB(Dj). The most
that i will ever be willing to o®er C is therefore determined by ¯nding the contract of
j that results in the smallest payo® for i, called Dj. Following this logic reveals that,
loosely speaking, C will contract with the player that has the greatest willingness to pay.
In other words, there will not be an SPE in which C accepts a contract from one player
while the other has a greater willingness to pay. From the players' willingness to pay, we
get the maximum SPE payment to C in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The maximum SPE payment to C is






AUi¾B : ¾i 2 R
¡
i (¾¡i)gg
Proof. First, let Dj(s¡C) = argminDj sA(Dj)TUisB(Dj). That is, Dj is the contract that
minimizes i's payo® given s¡C. The proof follows from the strategic considerations of the
players. Either (1) neither player pays C, or (2) player i pays C. In the case of (2), i will
o®er C no more than necessary, which is the minimum increment above what C would
get by accepting j's o®er, Dj. Player i will only be willing to pay this amount if it is less
than the amount that she gains by changing the game from ¡(Dj) to ¡(Di),
±i(Di;Djjs¡C) = mi(Dijs¡C) ¡ mi(Djjs¡C):
18This is the di®erence between i's payo®s in ¡(Dj) and ¡(Di). This di®erence is maximized
by choosing Dj to minimize i's payo® in ¡(Dj) and choosing Di to maximize i's payo®
in ¡(Di). Given s¡C, these arguments are Dj and ^ Di respectively. So we have that the
maximum i will pay in an SPE of ¡C given s¡C is ±i( ^ Di;Djjs¡C).
Maximizing i's payo® over all functions s¡C and contracts Di we get the maxagg
Mi. Minimizing i's payo® over all functions s¡C we get mins¡C Dj(s¡C) where the
minimizer si
¡C = argmins¡C sA(Dj(s¡C))TUisB(Dj(s¡C)) yields Dj(si
¡C). However, we
know that since si
¡C is part of an SPE, that si




j(Dj)). In other words, the only requirement in constructing si
¡C is that i
is always playing a best response. This is because Dj can be such that si
j(Dj) is a best










AUi¾B : ¾i 2 R
¡
i (¾j)g:
Putting this together with i's maxagg and choosing i we get the result.
Theorem 5 gives an upper bound on the amount that the monopolist game miner can
extract from the game. This amount is bounded by the players' payo® functions. So
a monopolist game miner cannot, in this situation, extract arbitrary pro¯ts. However,
the SPE concept here allows for some behavior that is unreasonable from a trembling
hand perspective. For example, in order for C to achieve her maximum payment, it
may be necessary for A to o®er just under B's maximum willingness to pay, MB ¡
min¾A;¾Bf¾T
AUB¾B : ¾B 2 R¡
B(¾A)g, to C for the contract DA. This is despite the fact
that A might prefer the outcome under ^ DB to the outcome under DA. That is, A o®ers
quite a bit of money to C for a deal she wants not to take e®ect. A's o®er is only a
best response to B's slightly greater o®er because C will choose B's contract, so that this
unreasonable o®er by A, DA, will never be accepted by C. But if C trembled and chose
DA, the outcome could be disastrous for A. In short, for some ¡C, there exist SPE in
which C achieves her maximum payo® only if one of the players acts in a manner that
seems unreasonable.
This suggests that a more reasonable set of outcomes is one in which players will
only o®er contracts ^ Di (i = A;B) such that mi(Dijs¡C) is maximized. That is, players
will maximize the aggregate payo® function regardless of the way in which that money
is divided. They would do this because at least one ^ Di 2 ^ Di is a best response to every
19Dj and s¡C. The following °ow diagram illustrates how these strategies would translate
into the monopolist miner's payo®s. Let
±i(Dijs¡C) = mi(Dijs¡C) ¡ mi(D0js¡C)
be the change in i's payo® by going from ¡ to ¡(Di). Similarly de¯ne
±i(Di;Djjs¡C) = mi(Dijs¡C) ¡ mi(Djjs¡C)
as the change in i's payo® by going from ¡(Dj) to ¡(Di). Positive quantities represent
proportional movements in the direction of the associated arrow.
¡( ^ DB)
±A( ^ DA; ^ DB)
±B( ^ DB; ^ DA)
¡( ^ DA)
¡
±B( ^ DB) ±A( ^ DA)
±A(D0; ^ DB)
±B(D0; ^ DA)
This shows how the players' willingness to pay a®ects the outcome as long as the
players are not acting in the unreasonable manner described above (i.e. o®ering more
than their willingness to pay). So if ±B( ^ DB) > 0, we know that B is willing to pay to
change the game from ¡ to ¡( ^ DB). Hence, ¡ will not be the post-contract subgame in an
SPE. Next, if ±B( ^ DB; ^ DA) > ±A( ^ DA; ^ DB) > 0, then B is willing to pay more to change the
game from ¡( ^ DA) to ¡( ^ DB) than A is willing to pay to change it from ¡( ^ DB) to ¡( ^ DA).
B will o®er C a contract such that C's payment is just greater than A's is willing to pay
to change the game from ¡( ^ DB) to ¡( ^ DA). In some games, the restriction that players
choose only contracts from Di (i = A;B) will decrease C's maximium SPE payo®.
Another implication of theorem 5 is that C's payo® can be greater than maxfMA;MBg.
In other words, the winning contract may pay C more than the maxagg for either player.
The following example illustrates how a monopolist miner can make both players worse
20o® than they were without the opportunity to mine. We demonstrate that this is the case
even when players are restricted to choosing contracts that maximize aggregate payo®
functions.
Example 4. Consider the game ¡:
x y z
x ¡1;2 ¡1;3 0;0
y ¡1;¡1 0;0 3;¡1
z ¡1;¡1 ¡1;¡1 2;¡1
where A is the row player. There is one pure NE (y;y) of ¡. Calculating the A's aggregate
payo® function for ^ DA, ^ DB and ^ D0 as well as A's willingness to pay, we get:
mA( ^ DAjs¡C) = 2; mA( ^ DBjs¡C) = ¡1 and mA(D0js¡C) = 0
) ±A( ^ DA; ^ DB) = 3 and ±A( ^ DA) = 2
By symmetry the quantities for B are the same as the corresponding quantities of A.
The fact that ±i( ^ Di) = 2 > 0 for i = A;B means that both players are willing to
pay to change the game from ¡ to ¡( ^ Di), so D0 will not be the outcome. Next, because
±i( ^ Di; ^ Dj) = 3 > 0 for i = A;B, we know that C will get a payo® of ±i( ^ Di; ^ Dj) = 3 in
equilibrium. This payo® is greater than Mi ¡ mA(D0js¡C) = 2. In other words, if i's
contract is accepted, then the contract between i and C pays C more than the increase in
aggregate payo®s Mi ¡ mA(D0js¡C) = 2. The reason is that i is paying to avoid having
¡( ^ Dj) become the equilibrium game.
We also observe that sA( ^ Di)TU
Di
i sB( ^ Di) = ¡1 < 0 = mA(D0js¡C). This says that i
gets less by having the equilibrium contract with C than i would get if neither player had
the opportunity to o®er contracts. For j, the player that does not win the equilibrium
contract, the SPE payo® is also ¡1. Therefore, the winner and the loser are both made
worse o® by the opportunity to mine 3
4.2 C Accepts Both Contracts
We now relax the assumption that C must choose between DA and DB. After all, if
C is a true monopolist game miner and there are gains to be made by simultaneously
contracting with both parties, then C will certainly want to do this.
21The strategies in ¡C must be modi¯ed to accommodate this new possibility. First, a
strategy SC for C selects an element of C's choice set DC after the history (DA;DB) 2 D2.
Since C can now choose to accept both contracts if she wishes, the choice set DC is given
by:
DC = f(DA;DB);(DA;D0);(D0;DB);(D0;D0)g:
This induces the game ¡(Di;Dj) where Di (i = A;0) is the contract between A and C
and Dj (j = B;0) is the contract between B and C. Therefore, the game ¡(Di;Dj) is one
in which A's preferences are U
Di
A and B's preferences are U
Dj
B . This means that the stage
three strategy pro¯le s¡C = (sA;sB) is de¯ned on D2 so that si : (D)2 7! ¢i (i = A;B).
In other words, players select a strategy for every possible post-contract subgame of the
form ¡(Di;Dj).
We refer to the stage three game that is played in equilibrium of ¡C as the equilibrium
game. If C accepts only DA, then the equilibrium game is ¡(DA). If C accepts DA and
DB, then the equilibrium game is ¡(DA;DB) and so on. The game ¡(DA;DB) was not
possible when C could only accept a single contract. However, when C can accept both
contracts it is possible.
This raises the issue of determining how A chooses DA given that B is choosing DB.
Given a function s¡C = (sA;sB), B's contract DB and C's decision SC, A chooses a







This gives rise to a best response correspondence for A.
De¯nition 4. Player A's best contract response correspondence given s¡C is a set valued
function ©A(Tjs¡C) : D 7! 2D that gives all of the contracts DA that maximize 4 when
B makes contract DB given s¡C.
By requiring that s¡C selects a NE of every post-contract subgame, we guarantee that
sA(SC(DA;DB)) is a best response to sA(SC(DA;DB)) and vice versa. When s¡C meets
this requirement, the best contract response correspondence amounts to a best response
correspondence for the extensive form game. The following result uses the concept of a
best contract response correspondence to categorize a monopolist game miner's payo®s
when able to accept both contracts.
22Theorem 6. The monopolist game miner's equilibrium payo®s under the restriction that
C can only accept one contract are always as good and sometimes better than her payo®s
without that restriction.
Proof. Suppose ±A( ^ DA) ¸ 0 and/or ±B( ^ DB) ¸ 0 and ±A( ^ DA; ^ DB) ¸ ±B( ^ DB; ^ DA) ¸ 0,
then with the restriction, C gets ±B( ^ DB; ^ DA). However, without the restriction, there is
the possibility that for some DA and DB, A and B both prefer ¡(DA;DB) to ¡( ^ DA) and
¡( ^ DB). If DA 2 ©A(DB) and DB 2 ©B(DA) given s¡C, then this will be an equilibrium.
When the equilibrium game is ¡(DA;DB), neither player is paying for exclusivity, so C's
payo® is zero instead of ±B(DB;DA).
Further, the threat of an outcome ¡(DA;DB) can never induce i to pay more than
±j( ^ Dj; ^ Di) for exclusivity. This is because ±j( ^ Dj; ^ Di) is the value for j of going from
¡( ^ DA) to ¡( ^ DB). Given that i pays for exclusivity, there is no payment that j can
make to change the game from ¡( ^ DA) to ¡(DA;DB) because i's contract is contingent
on exclusivity.
Theorem 6 says that a monopolist game miner cannot be made worse o® by restricting
herself to accept a single contract. The reason is that when C does not restrict herself,
then she does not give up DA in order to accept DB. Therefore, if C accepts DB, then
her best response is to accept any contract DA for which her payo® under ¡(DA;DB) is
at least her payo® under ¡(DB). Knowing this, A will choose DA such that C's payo®
under ¡(DA;DB) is exactly what it is under ¡(DB). The same holds for B. Therefore,
C is made worse-o® by the ability to make contracts with both players. Put di®erently,
the threat of an equilibrium game ¡(DA;DB) never induces the players to pay more, and
it is sometimes better for the players.
The above suggests that the one-contract restriction might be the result of pay-
o® maximizing behavior. That is, C's payo® in equilibrium of the one-contract game
might be equivalent to a payment not to contract with the other player. Hence, the
restricted game is equivalent to a game in which A and B submit two-element stage-
one o®ers, (Di;zi), where Di is the matrix of strategy-contingent transfers and zi is a
payment not to make a contract with j. If zi = 0, then i places no exclusivity re-
striction on C's acceptance of Di. Therefore, C's payo® from accepting A's contract is
zA + sA(DA;D0)TDAsB(DA;D0). If zA = zB = 0 then C's payo® from accepting both
contracts is sA(DA;DB)T(DA + DB)sB(DA;DB).
234.3 Sequential Contracts
We now examine the role of timing on game mining outcomes. The game is exactly as
previously described, except that A ¯rst selects a contract to be observed by B before B
selects a contract. In this setting we ¯nd that A may have a ¯rst-mover advantage and
also that contracts are not equivalent to the pre-commitments of Renou (2009). Both
points are demonstrated in the following example.
Example 5. Consider the game ¡ where A is the row player. The unique NE of this
x y z
x 2,5 0,0 5,4
y 1,3 1,2 2,0
z 0,3 0,1 2,0
game is (x;x). Note that x is a strictly dominant strategy for B. By theorem 3, there
is no contract DA such that A gets a better payo® in a NE of ¡(DA) than in a NE of
¡. Despite this fact, there is a contract DA such that sA(DA;DB)TU
DA
A sB(DA;DB) >
sA(D0)TUAsB(D0) where DB 2 ©B(DA). In other words, there is a contract DA such that
when B chooses his best contract response to DA, A gets a higher payo® in ¡(DA;©B(DA))
than in any NE of ¡. For example, if A signs a contract with C to pay C 2 whenever the
outcome is (x;x), then the unique NE of ¡(DA) is (y;x). The resultant game, ¡(DA) is
given by:
x y z
x 0,5 0,0 5,4
y 1,3 1,2 2,0
z 0,3 0,1 2,0
Then B's best response is a contract DB that promises to pay C 4 if the outcome is
(y;x) and 3 if the outcome is (y;y). This will make (x;z) the unique NE of ¡(DA;DB).
x y z
x 0,5 0,0 5,4
y 1,-1 1,-1 2,0
z 0,3 0,1 2,0
The ¯nal outcome is best for A. Note that if B was the ¯rst to select a contract, then
B would choose D0 to which A's best response is D0.
24This example draws a sharp distinction between game mining and pre-commitments
to play or not play certain strategies. Suppose A instead selected a contract that made x
a never-best-response. Then B's best response is D0, and the outcome is (y;x), which is
worse for A. A does not want to commit to not playing x because (x;z) is the ultimate
goal. He rather wants to commit to (x;x) not being the outcome, so that B will commit
to (y;x) and (y;y) not being the outcome 3
Exploiting contract timing is yet another way that game miners game miners can
extract pro¯ts from players even when players are making the o®ers. Since A has a
¯rst-mover advantage, and B has a second-mover disadvantage, both are willing to pay
to move ¯rst. Suppose A recognizes this advantage before B and approaches C with his
desired contract DA. C could potentially put A on hold and notify B to start a bidding
war over the ¯rst-mover advantage. The ¯rst-mover advantage is worth more to A than
it is to B, ¯ve versus one, so A would end up paying B's maximum willingness to pay.
This is despite the fact that players are o®ering the contracts and C is free to accept
both.
4.4 C Makes O®ers
Until this point we have assumed a particular bargaining structure in which A and B
make take-it-or-leave-it o®ers to C. This implies that C's only bargaining power is in
rejecting contracts that result in negative payo®s. Suppose now that we change the game
so that C makes publicly observable o®ers to A and B, and then A and B simultaneously
accept or reject the o®ers C has made. So A and B will now accept any contract that
does not make them worse o®, given the other's choice. This clearly places more power
in the hands of C.
To accommodate the new structure of the game, we alter the de¯nition of strategies.
Now C's stage one strategy is sC 2 D2. A and B have binary stage two strategies
s2
i : D2 7! faccept;rejectg and stage-three strategies s3
i : D2 7! ¢i (i = A;B), which we
sometimes shorten to be s2
¡C and s3
¡C. So C selects a contract for each player, sC. Then
each player chooses to accept or reject the contract they are o®ered, s2
i for i = A;B.
Then, the players play the resultant game, s3
i for i = A;B.
We want to characterize C's payo®s in an SPE. To do so, consider the following devious
plan where C can sometimes create a high-order Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) between A
and B. This is illustrated in the example below.
25Example 6. Consider the game ¡ where A is the row player.
w x y z
w 4,4 0,0 0,0 0,5
x 0,0 1,2 0,0 0,0
y 0,0 0,0 2,1 0,0
z 5,0 0,0 0,0 3,3
The NE of ¡ is (z;z) at which both players get a payo® of 3. C's plan is the following:
choose DA and DB so that both players have a strictly dominant strategy to accept, given
s3
¡C (in this example the caveat \given s3
¡C" won't come into play because we make sure
that ¡, ¡(DA), ¡(DB), and ¡(DA;DB) all have unique NE) Suppose C sets DA so that
¡(DA) is:
w x y z
w 1.01,4 1,0 1,0 0,5
x 0,0 0,2 0,0 .5,0
y 0,0 0,0 5,1 0,0
z 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3
The NE of ¡(DA) is (y;y) where payo®s are (5;1). So when DB = D0 (i.e. B rejects
the contract o®ered to him), A has the incentive to accept DA because A's payo® will
increase from 3 under ¡ to 5 under ¡(DA). Note that A's payo® for (y;y) in ¡ was only
2, so this means that DA stipulates that C pays A when (y;y) occurs. Then C sets DB
so that ¡(DB) is:
w x y z
w 4,1.01 0,0 0,0 0,0
x 0,1 1,5 0,0 0,0
y 0,1 0,0 2,0 0,0
z 5,0 0,0 0,.5 3,0
The NE of ¡(DB) is (x;x) where payo®s are (1;5). So B has the incentive to accept
DB given that DA = D0 (i.e. A rejects the contract o®ered to him) because B's payo®
will increase from 3 to 5. Note that B's payo® for (x;x) in ¡ was only 2, so this means
that DB stipulates that C pays B when (x;x) occurs.
If both of the players accept their respective contracgts, we get ¡(DA;DB):
The NE of ¡(DA;DB) is (w;w) where payo®s are (1:01;1:01). So A has the incentive
to accept DA given that B accepts because A's payo® will increase from 1 under ¡(DB) to
26w x y z
w 1.01,1.01 1,0 1,0 0,0
x 0,1 0,5 0,0 .5,0
y 0,1 0,0 5,0 0,0
z 5,0 0,0 0,.5 0,0
1:01 under ¡(DA;DB). Similarly B has the incentive to accept DB given that A accepts
because B's payo® will increase from 1 under ¡(DA) to 1:01 under ¡(DA;DB)2.
This is very similar to a PD game because both players have a strictly dominant
strategy to accept the contract that C o®ers. This moves them from a situation where
the only NE gives them (3;3) to a situation where the only NE gives them (1:01;1:01).
By playing A against B the game miner C gets 2(4 ¡ 1:01) = 5:98 in the unique SPE of
¡C. The situation can be visualized alternatively as the following PD game where A is





The example above shows that C can potentially do better for herself by selecting
contracts that both A and B will accept than by contracting with one player exclusively.
The intuition for why this is possible is that C relies on the fact that ¡(DA) and ¡(DB)
will never obtain in equilibrium. Therefore, C is free to o®er contracts DA and DB such
that she loses money in the NE of ¡(DA) and ¡(DB). This allows her the °exibility to
make sure the NE of ¡(DA;DB) is in her favor. Note that this is true even in many games
where players have strictly dominant strategies in ¡ as well as constant-sum games. The
following example depicts a game where both players have dominant strategies.
Example 7. Consider the game ¡ where A is the row player and both players have a
2Note that the NE of ¡(DA;DB), (w;w), is not in R¡
i (¾j) for any ¾j 2 ¢j for i = A;B, j = A;B
and j 6= i
27strictly dominant strategy to choose z.
x y z
x 5;5 1;5 1;6
y 5;1 1;1 2;2
z 6;1 2;2 3;3
:














the NE of ¡(DA) is (y;z). A's payo® in ¡(DA) is 2 ¡ (¡3) = 5, so A would accept DA,
getting 5 rather than 3. B's payo® in ¡(DA) is 2. If C o®ers DB = DT
A to B, then the
equilibrium of ¡(DA;DB) is (x;x). The payo® to B is 5 ¡ 2:99 = 2:01. Therefore, B
would accept DB given that A accepts DA because he will get 2:01 rather than 2. By
the symmetry of ¡, DA and DB, we know that each player i has a dominant strategy to
accept Di regardless of whether j 6= i accepts or rejects his o®ered contract 3
The following theorem provides an upper bound on the game miner's payo® when she
extracts pro¯ts according to this scheme.
Theorem 7. The maximum that a monopolist game miner can pro¯t by o®ering contracts


































Proof. The ¯rst term is the maximum amount that A and B can earn in any outcome
of ¡. The second term is the minimum amount that C can force B to get by designing
DA such that x0
A is a best response to x0
B. This is because C is constrained so that x0
B
must lie on B's best response correspondence for ¡. The third term is the equivalent of
the second term for A rather than B.
28Suppose C earns more than this maximum, then
sA(DA;DB)


































but because A and B each have a weakly dominant strategy to accept, we know that
sA(DA;DB)




T(UB ¡ DB)sB(DA;DB) ¸ sA(DA;D0)
TUBsB(DA;D0):

















The left-hand-side is C's pro¯t, and the maximum of the right-hand-side is given by the
right-hand-side of inequality 5. Therefore, we have a contradiction.
This result is important because it says that the game miner cannot make an arbitrary
pro¯t from the players by giving each a dominant strategy to accept her o®er. Therefore,
the monopolist can always do only limited damage.
5 Multiple Miners
Since a monopolist game miner can extract pro¯ts from the interaction between A and
B, it is reasonable to think that other game miners will enter this market. In addition,
29the opportunity to sign game mining contracts can bene¯t players. So if one player ¯nds
a game miner to contract with, then the other player is likely to seek out his own game
miner. For these reasons, we introduce multiple game miners to examine the role of
competition on outcomes. We call this extensive game ¡N.
5.1 Perfect Competition
We begin with the assumption that there are a very large number of game miners available
for contracting. This assumption means that i will never pay a game miner not to contract
with j, because j can readily ¯nd another external party to contract with if a contract
is desirable. In this section we also adhere to the assumption that players make contract
o®ers to game miners, and that these contracts are made simultaneously.
Naturally, in this competitive environment, game miners will earn the marginal cost
of their service, which is assumed to be zero. Therefore, we worry primarily about
characterizing the equilibrium game ¡(DA;DB) (i.e. the post-contract subgame that is
played in equilibrium). To do so, we ¯rst consider the problem that A faces when choosing














B , and each pair of utilities is mapped to strategies by s¡C.
Before our next result, we introduce some notation. Let Mi(DijDj) be the aggregate
payo® set for i given that j's contract is Dj. Let M¤
i (DijDj) be the maximum element of
Mi(DijDj). And let Mi(Dj) = maxDifM¤
i (DijDj)g be the maximum of all the aggregate
payo® sets for all contracts Di 2 D given Dj.
Theorem 8. If ¡0 is an equilibrium game of ¡N for all s¡C, then i gets Mi(Dj) in all
NE of ¡0.
Proof. We can add a conditional argument to i's aggregate payo® function to indicate
30that j's contract is given. The equilibrium payo®s ¡(DA;DB) are then characterized by
mA(DAjDB;s¡C) = mA( ^ DAjDB;s¡C)
mB(DBjDA;s¡C) = mB( ^ DBjDA;s¡C)
Otherwise mi(DijDj;s¡C) < Mi(Dj), and for some s0
¡C 6= s¡C, there is an alternative
D0
i such that mi(D0
ijDj;s0
¡C) = Mi(Dj).
One example of a game ¡0 that is an equilibrium game for all s¡C is one in which
players have strictly dominant strategies. Theorem 3 says that if B has a strictly dominant
strategy, then A cannot bene¯t from a game mining contract without hurting the game




B both exhibit a strictly dominant strategy, then neither player
will have the opportunity to make a bene¯cial contract with an outside party. In other
words, such a DA and DB would be an equilibrium game ¡(DA;DB) because neither
player will want to deviate. Of course not all games with strictly dominant strategies
are equilibrium games. It must be that DA does not require A to pay the game miner
when choosing his best response to B's strictly dominant strategy under DB (likewise for





strictly dominant strategies, then we must have that xT
ADAxB = 0. Otherwise, A could
do better against DB by choosing a contract where xT
ADAxB = 0 holds.
However, if UA and UB in ¡ both exhibit strictly dominant strategies it still is entirely
possible to have an equilibrium game ¡(DA;DB) where players sign something other than
the null contract (i.e. DA 6= D0 6= DB). That is, if B selects DB so that U
DB
B does not
exhibit a strictly dominant strategy, then A might have a best response DA 2 ©A(DBjs¡C)
so that U
DA
A does not exhibit a strictly dominant strategy (or exhibits a di®erent strictly
dominant strategy). If DB 2 ©B(DAjs¡C), then we have an equilibrium game ¡(DA;DB)
that is di®erent from ¡. This is despite the fact that both UA and UB exhibit strictly
dominant strategies.
Another important issue that arises is whether A and B must be allowed to randomly
select contracts to o®er their respective game miners in order to guarantee the existence
of an equilibrium.
De¯nition 5. A mixed contract for player i is a mapping §A : D 7! [0;1] such that
R
D §i(Di)dDi = 1.
In an SPE where players' strategies employ (proper) mixed contracts, each player will
31be indi®erent among the contracts that he plays with positive probability given the other
player's mixed contract strategy and s¡C. In particular, if A is randomizing between
contracts DA and D0


























Using this description of mixed contract equilibria, we explore the existence of SPE of
¡N.
Theorem 9. There exist games ¡N and functions s¡C = (sA;sB), such that s¡C is part
of an SPE if and only if A and B use mixed contracts.
Proof. Let © = (©A;©B). By Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem, we know that if D2 non-
empty, compact and convex, and © : D2 7! 2D2 is a set valued function on D2 with a closed
graph and the property that ©(DA;DB) is nonempty and convex for all (DA;DB) 2 D2,
then © has a ¯xed point. However, if © only includes pure best responses, then we
lose convexity, i.e. for distinct DA and D0
A 2 ©I(DB), we don't generally have that
D00
A = ®DA + (1 ¡ ®)D0




A;dB) = 0 implies sA(D00
A;DB)TD00
AsB(D00
A;dB) = 0 only if
si(DA;DB) = si(D0
A;DB) = si(D00
A;DA), which does not generally hold.
The fact that s¡C must be a NE of ¡(DA;DB) restricts the set of ¯xed points (DA;DB)
rather than restricting the set of correspondences © for ¡N. Further, there are no restric-
tions on UA or UB. Therefore, for every DA and DB, we can ¯nd matrices UA and UB such
that DA 2 ©A(DB). Hence, we invoke Kakutani's theorem to say that the convexity of ©
is necessary for the general existence of ¯xed points of ©(Tjs¡C). Hence mixed strategies
are necessary for ¯xed points of ©(Tjs¡C), for some ¡N and s¡C.
When A and B use mixed contracts, each has uncertainty about which game ¡(DA;DB)
will ultimately be played. This is reminiscent of what occurs in a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium. Yet there is an important di®erence. The di®erence is that A and B's realized
contracts are announced publicly after the game miners accept them in stage two. So
when they play ¡(DA;DB), they both know which game they are playing. Hence, there
is uncertainty about contracts, but only in stage one when they are selecting contracts,
not when they are playing the post-contract subgame in stage three. So game mining
32introduces the possibility for a new kind of uncertainty about other players' payo®s. This
uncertainty a®ects how one chooses one's own payo®s but not how one plays the game
once payo®s are chosen.
5.2 Duopoly
We now alter the assumption that there are many game miners. Instead suppose that
there are only two. This makes it possible for i to pay for exclusive contracts with both
game miners in order to keep j from obtaining a contract of his own. Like before, we
assume players A and B make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it contract o®ers. However,
this time they are making o®ers to game miners C and E. Each player makes one contract
o®er to each of the game miners, i.e. Di = (DC
i ;DE
i ) 2 D2 (i = A;B). Each game miner
cannot accept more than one contract o®er.
Here, because there are only two game miners it might be reasonable for one player
to pay for exclusivity with both game miners. In other words, even though A only cares
about DA = DC
A+DE
A, or his \aggregate contract," he may be willing to split the contract
between C and E so that C and E both prefer A's o®ered contract over any contract B
is willing to o®er. Whether or not A is willing to pay each duopolist enough to exclude
B will depend on A's relative gains to exclusivity versus A's outcome when he does not
exclude B. We will use the construction, i blocks j from ¡0, to refer to a situation in
which i pays for exclusivity in a way that prevents j from getting a contract that brings
about ¡0.
We examine this blocking behavior below for each possible equilibrium game ¡, ¡(Di)
for i = A;B and ¡(DA;DB). First assume the following notation:
±A((©A;DB);DBjs¡C) = ©A(DBjs¡C) ¡ mA(DBjs¡C):
So ±A((©A;DB);DBjs¡C) is the amount that A will pay in order to change the game from
¡(DB) to ¡(©A(DB);DB). Like before, we omit the conditional argument s¡C to simplify
the notation.
Given that the equilibrium game is ¡, there are two possibilities
1. neither player blocks the other
2. i blocks j from ¡(Dj)
33The ¯rst situation results in duopolist payo®s of (0;0) because neither player is paying
for an exclusive contract. This might occur if there is no opportunity for game min-
ing (i.e. ^ Di = D0 for i = A;B). The second situation results in duopolist payo®s of
(±j( ^ Dj);±j( ^ Dj)). That is, i pays each duopolist a quantity that just exceeds j's willing-
ness to pay to change the game from ¡ to ¡( ^ Dj). This might occur if i prefers ¡ to ¡( ^ Dj)
at least twice as much as j prefers ¡( ^ Dj) to ¡.
Given that the equilibrium game is ¡(Di), there are three possibilities
1. neither player blocks the other
2. i blocks j from ¡( ^ Dj)
3. i blocks j from ¡(Dk
A;Dm
B) for k;m 2 fC;Eg, k 6= m.
The ¯rst situation again results in duopolist payo®s of (0;0). The second situation results
in duopolist payo®s of (®±j( ^ Dj);(1¡®)±j( ^ Dj)) where ® 2 [0;1]. The reason is that j will
have to get exclusive contracts with both game miners if he is to induce ¡( ^ Dj). Therefore,
if i wants to block j, i needs the sum of his payments to C and E to be greater than
j's willingness to pay to change the game from ¡(Di) to ¡( ^ Dj). The third situation is
a bit more complicated. It is a setting where i has contracted for exclusivity with both
game miners, o®ering contracts DC
i and DE
i . If j was to pay one of the game miners, say
E, more than i o®ered E, then the resultant game would be ¡(DC
i ;DE
j ). If i is to block
j from doing this, then player i has to o®er E at least ±B((DC
i ;Áj);Di). This quantity
is j's willingness to pay in order to change the game from ¡(Di) to ¡(DC
i ;Áj(DC
i )).
Naturally, i must pay C the quantity ±B((DE




Finally we explore what happens when the equilibrium game is ¡(DA;DB). Here
there are two possibilities
1. neither player blocks the other
2. i blocks j from ¡( ^ Dj)
3. i blocks j from ¡( ^ Dj) and j blocks i from ¡( ^ Di).
The ¯rst situation again results in duopolist payo®s of (0;0). The second situation results
in duopolist payo®s of (±j( ^ Dj);0). Here i pays C the amount of j's willingness to pay,
±j( ^ Dj), in order to keep j from getting an exclusive contract with C. However, j pays
34nothing to block i from getting an exclusive contract with E. This might be because
j prefers ¡( ^ Dj) to ¡(DA;DB) while i prefers ¡(DA;DB) to ¡( ^ Di). The third situation
is an extension of the second. Here both players are blocking the other from getting
an exclusive contract. Player i will make o®ers to both C and E. These o®ers will be
such that, given j's o®ers, C accepts and E rejects. E instead accepts j's o®er. Player
i pays C enough in ¡(DA;DB) so that it is not worthwhile for j to o®er C a greater
amount, causing C to accept and inducing the game ¡( ^ Dj). The amount that j pays E
in ¡(DA;DB) is enough so that it is not worthwhile for i to o®er E a greater amount,
causing E to accept and inducing the game ¡( ^ Di).
Of course there are many more SPE of the game mining duopoly than are characterized
by the above blocking behavior. In fact, many of the SPE can involve combinations of
the above blocking behavior, where A and B are both blocking each other from various
games. Other SPE may rely on the type of \unreasonable" behavior discussed at the
end of section 4.1. For example, i o®ers contracts that pay more than i's maximum
willingness to pay, only because j is willing to o®er yet more.
6 Discussion
As mentioned in the introduction, the game mining analysis opens up several new research
areas. One natural extension is to consider game mining situations in which there are
more than two players. With multiple players simultaneously choosing contracts, the
blocking and exclusivity concerns we address above are likely to become much more
complicated. An open question is whether the game miner has more or less opportunity
to pro¯t as the number of players grows.
Another research area concerns the di±culty of modeling the game miner's uncertainty
over which outcome will obtain in the game ¡(DA) after signing the contract DA with
player A. In an SPE analysis, the game miner's decision to sign or not sign DA occurs
through the process of backward induction. That is, the SPE approach assumes the game
miner somehow knows the outcome of ¡(DA), s¡C(DA), before she signs the contract with
A. In the real world, the game miner would likely not be so certain about future events.
In fact, the game miner's beliefs would likely assign nonzero probability to the occurrence
of non-equilibrium outcomes of ¡(DA). Hence, rather than an equilibrium-approach, it
may be valuable to adopt a statistical approach to game mining, such as the Predictive
35Game Theory (PGT) models described in Wolpert (2008).
Yet another research question is whether replacing the structured bargaining between
players and game miners with unstructured bargaining will change the pro¯tability of
game mining. One might also consider the reverse a situation in which the stage game
¡ is a game of unstructured bargaining between A and B, but the negotiations between
players and game miners follow structured bargaining. Here, we would have that players
sign contracts through structured bargaining in an attempt to gain an advantage in the
unstructured bargaining that follows. The question is how would players design contracts
to distort their utility possibilities set in such a way that bene¯ts them in the ensuing
unstructured bargaining. An interesting technical issue arises in deciding whether to
allow players to sign contracts that lead to utility possibility sets that are nonconvex. If
so, then a solution concept other than the Nash Bargaining Solution is needed [see Nash
(1950); Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)].
The following phenomenon, which is closely related to game mining, also deserves a
rigorous analysis. That is, player A may want to form a contract with the game miner,
C, to pay player B an outcome-contingent amount. This is much like the setup of JW,
where players make outcome-contingent side-payments to each other.
However, there are some situations in which a contract between A and C to pay B
outcome-contingent amounts can actually hurt B. In such instances, C will be faced
with this peculiar question from B: \How much do I have to pay you never to give me
money?" Here A bene¯ts from an obligation to pay B, while B would be hurt by such
a payment. Hence, unlike JW, where the question is whether side-payments can bring
about the e±cient outcome, we ask if this is an opportunity for the game miner to pro¯t.
That is, can the game miner leverage A's desire to have the contract against B's desire
not to have the contract in order to extract pro¯t?
To gain intuition for why such a strange arrangement might be bene¯cial for A and
detrimental for B, consider the following two-stage game of complete and perfect infor-
mation. A, as the row player, moves ¯rst, and then B moves (i.e., a Stackelberg game).





If A were to move T(op), then B would move L(eft), and A would get ¡1. If instead A
36were to move D(own), then A would get 0. So A moves D, gets 0, and B gets 3.





then if A were to move T, B would move R(ight), and A would get 10. So now the
equilibrium is (T;R), with A getting 10.
So if we start with the bimatrix 7, but A can get the game miner, C, to pay B an




then we wind up with the bimatrix 8, where A bene¯ts by 10 ¡ 0 = 10, and B loses by
2 ¡ 3 = ¡1.
So for example, if C is a bank to which B owes a lot of money, and A can pay the
bank so that B's debt is reduced by DB, it bene¯ts A. As an example, a payment to C
of 3 would work.
As an example, say that B owes a loan shark a lot of money, and this loan shark
would have no qualms about who pays him in B's name. Then the miner can pay o®
(output-contingent amounts of) B's debt. More generally, even if we simply had Game
Mining Inc. send a bar of gold to B, wouldn't it be the case that B cannot pretend that
he will throw the gold away? After all, that would be a non-credible threat; the original
game is over, and B gets a bar of gold in the mail, so he cannot credibly claim that
he would throw it away. Even if B could somehow protect himself pro-actively against
gold delivered by the Post O±ce, Game Mining Inc. could simply commit to sending
something to B, at some unspeci¯ed time within the next year, with the needed value.
Naturally, whenever B is hurt by such a contract between A and C, B might want
to form a contract with another external party, saying \if I get a gift from Game Mining
Inc., you take the exact same amount from my bank account." But this is exactly the idea
behind our arguments above. The \external party" that B uses can potentially demand
a pro¯t for their services.
37All of this raises a crucial question: Why aren't real game mining ¯rms wreaking
havoc on real markets? Game mining appears to be very possible according to basic
game theory, so if it is not generally possible in the real world, what assumptions are
being violated?
There are many potential answers to this question. One tempting explanation is that
the payo® structure of most real world games makes them unable to be mined. This
seems a strange assertion because, as shown, even games in which both players have
strictly dominant strategies can be mined for pro¯t depending on the market structure.
Other potential answers are that the calculations are too di±cult in practice, that the
time frame in real world games is too short, that game mining could be considered illegal,
that imperfect information limits game mining opportunity, or that some kind of strategic
uncertainty makes game mining impractical. These explanations should be explored in
future work because they might shed light on the way game theory applies to real world
strategic settings.
There are other questions to explore. For instance, does game mining imply that
certain games should never exist because the minute they appear they will be mined into
an alternate game? In some sense this gives rise to a meta-game whereby a player that
¯nds himself involved in an easily mineable game might assume that the game will be
mined and therefore conclude that he is actually playing a di®erent game. Or, in a game
with multiple equilibria, one equilibrium might make the game susceptible to mining
by an outside party that ultimately makes both parties worse o® (like what happens
when a monopolist makes o®ers that give players strictly dominant strategies to accept).
Therefore, that susceptible equilibrium might become less likely than an equilibrium that
is more robust. In this way game mining introduces an equilibrium re¯nement: choose
the equilibrium that makes game mining least pro¯table.
These questions and others are not only interesting for their ability to shed light
on game mining concepts, but also more generally for their ability to shed light on the
noncooperative theory.
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